Hotjar sets this cookie when a user recording starts and when data is sent through the WebSocket. Hotjar sets this cookie when a Recording starts and is read when the recording module is initialized, to see if the user is already in a recording in a particular session. It stores the true/false value, indicating whether it was the first time Hotjar saw this user. Hotjar sets this cookie to identify a new user’s first session.
Google Analytics sets this cookie for user behaviour tracking. Google Analytics sets this cookie to store and count page views. These cookies help provide information on metrics the number of visitors, bounce rate, traffic source, etc. A correct authentication in part signs that challenge, so timestamping is irrelevant here, your answers are either fresh or they're invalid anyway.īecause a physical FIDO authenticator is independent from the computer you are not necessarily "done for" if the computer is compromised, unless you've outfitted your computer with a finger to press keys it cannot, for example, press the button on the key, so there is no way for the compromised computer to obtain signatures from the authenticator with the UP (User Present) bit set, and checking UP in the signed response is part of WebAuthn.Other uncategorized cookies are those that are being analyzed and have not been classified into a category as yet.Īnalytical cookies are used to understand how visitors interact with the website. The Relying Party (a web site you want to authenticate to) sends a random challenge. If your root is compromised you're also done for.įor WebAuthn (and its predecessor U2F) none of this is correct. Also, it is probably possible to get the time-stamp within the kernel.
The question is then: does timestamping the response reduce the attack surface enough compared to the downsides? I'd argue yes since the described attack can offset a failed login and the actual attack after a MITM. The verification process takes place at authentication so that would just tell you the current time, something you already know, it's useless. But these OTP strings are generated by the Yubikey, not by Yubico so there's no way for them to be "signed" in this way. Just have yubikey sign the current time, you're already trusting them to correctly verify the key string.īy "them" you presumably mean Yubico not the Yubikey.
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